Morning Star/Evening Star

here we have reified the language of an agent 
language needs to be reified or you can't say things like
  'dad calls her Mary but I call her mom.'
   note solving this requires a take on the 'crossworld indivuation' problem
   we solve this by having an object. mom, in our 'head' which is 
     1. in I's model of 'dad', 'Mary' is attached to
       I's belief structure for 'mom'
     2. in I's model of 'I', 'mom' is also attached to 
       I's belief structure for 'mom
  note the this need not be the case but it has the effect that
    (belief I (equal (idea-of I mom) (idea-of dad Mary)))
  We wrote this us to comment on the use of contexts to address
   the cross world indivuation issues in model logic (as usually
   discussed in terms of the 'morning star - evening star problem').
   Imagine an observer, O, who is thinking about 3 'worlds', A,B,C.
     Each had the names for MS, ES, Venus
  ;;      1. O has
        (attach MS V)
        (attach ES V)
        (attach Venus V)
      
        and could 'conclude'
          -- (equal MS ES)
          -- (equal MS Venus)
          -- (equal MS Venus)
             (by using satisfaction in Os model)
        of course we always get 
          -- (equal ?X ?X) 
          by deduction NOT semantics
     
     2. in O - A has
        (attach MS V)
        (attach ES V)
        and O could 'conclude'
          -- (equal MS ES)
             (by using satisfaction in A's model)
        but when we look at As model to decide
          (equal MS Venus)
          we only get I-Dont-Know (IDK)
          as Venus does not have an attachment in A
          the partialness/information theoretic
            understanding of truth values
        the same goes for
          (equal ES Venus)
     
     2. B had the
        (attach MS V)
        (attach Venus V)
        and could 'conclude'
          (equal MS Venus)
          (by using satisfaction ib Bs model)
          (equal MS ES)
          also results in IDK
          as Venus does not have an attachment in B     
        as we get the same for
          (equal ES Venus)
     
     2. C had the
        (attach MS V1)
        (attach Venus V)
        (attach ES V1)
          where V and V1 are different  
        now we could 'conclude'
          -- (equal MS Venus)
             (by using satisfaction in Cs model)
        but looking in Cs model for 
          -- (equal MS ES) 
          results in False, ie,
          -- (not (equal MS ES))
          since they have different attachments in C    
        we get the same for
          (equal ES Venus)
     
 More interesting in the 'observers' belief structure
   -- (equal (idea-of A 'MS') Venus) 
    'When A thinks if 'MS' he means Venus.'
   note: I have illustrated the overloadong
     of the MS in English by including the 'silent' quotes
 but
   -- (not (equal (idea-of A 'MS') (idea-of C 'MS'))
 and
   -- (not (equal (idea-of C 'MS') Venus) 
   Os idea of MS disagrees(!) with Cs
   note: RWW believes this sentence cannot be expressed
         in Krikpe semantics
  ;;  This 'solves' the MS/ES problem because we can build an observer
  whose can imagine any collection of beliefs about the relations among 
  MS, ES and Venus and can correctly answer questions about the 
  beliefs of the associated imagined agents.  This is a 'solution' 
  in the same sense that once we can explain how different agents
  can have different sets of beliefs and correctly describe their 
  answers to various questions the 'problem' evaporates.
  note: NO model logic or odd reasoning system - just taking ordinary 
       first order satisfaction seriously.