The Heads of PredicablesFirst Reprinted by IBUKI: 2011-12-22
IntroductionThis document is a reprint of chapter 9 of the book Logic by Richard F. Clarke, S.J. published in 1889. Clarke was a Jesuit priest who wrote this book to defend Catholic Doctrine as it relates to the philosophical notion of 'universals'. This had been discussed by Aristotle and later by St. Thomas Aquinas but had recently (the late 19th century) come under attack by his contemporaries. The book as a whole defends the Catholic position on the issue of universals. Its interest to me is two fold: 1) it makes clear the interaction of Catholic Doctrine on philosophy in general; and 2) discusses both the scolastic answers and the development of these ideas. I view this as relavant to current discussions of what is needed in the 'head' of an autonomous agent in order to 'understand' the world. I have reprinted this particular text, rather than the original sources, because it has a unified discussion of the major positions on these issues, and is explained by someone whose education included these subjects, and who could articulate the interacting ideas these discussions. He also includes many examples useful in understanding the ideas. The first part of this chapter reviews the major philosphhical positions on ontology, that is what things there are. Later he describes the different kinds of attributes a thing can have. For me, this is a critical part of a blueprint for building a software system that itself can know about things. This reprint lacks Ancient Greek quotes and images. If you want the ancient greek quotes please let me know. I intend to add the images soon. The TextCHAPTER IXON THE HEADS OF PREDICABLESWe have now had before us the various doctrines respecting Universals. We have seen that the errors respecting them are closely allied to the errors .respecting Simple Apprehension or Conception. They commence with confusion of thought and they lead on to utter scepticism. These errors are multiform, but may be summed up under three heads: 1. The Ultra-Realists maintain that Universals as such have a real existence outside the mind—either as self-existent forms wandering about the world, or as existing in the Divine Intellect—and that when we form a general idea, the mind grasps one of these forms, or contemplates some of the ideas in the mind of God. 2. The Nominalists hold on the other hand that Universals as such have no sort of existence except in general names, which are a useful shorthand nomenclature under which classes may be summed up. When we form a general idea we really think of certain attributes which are individual, and which we observed in an individual, but which we assign to other individuals by reason of a supposed resemblance existing among them. 3. The Conceptualists assert that Universals exist in the mind, and are the creation of the mind, though based on certain similarities observed in a number of individuals: that, consequently, they are something relative, not absolute. In the act of Simple Apprehension we identify these similar attributes and give them a common name. 4. The Schoolmen, following Aristotle and St. Thomas, who may be called Moderate Realists, assert that Universals exist outside the mind but not as Universals, that in the act of Simple Apprehension the intellect abstracts from the individual apprehended the universal concept, and takes cognisance of the individual through the concept. The result of this act of Apprehension is the concept or idea by means of which our intellect grasps the thing apprehended or concerned. For we must not forget that though Simple Apprehension consists in the formation of concepts, the primary and immediate object of the intellectual act is not the concept but the object of which it is the concept. When I stand before the cage in the Zoological Gardens and form an idea of what a monkey[p 165]is, when I say to myself respecting one of the creatures before me, "Here is a monkey", the first object of my thoughts is the individual monkey who gives rise to my reflections. My idea of a monkey is the means which I employ in order to comprehend the individual before me. It requires a further mental process to turn my thoughts away from the concrete individual to the idea that I have formed of it. The fact that the first object of our thoughts is not the concept, but the individual through the concept, leads us to the difference between the two kinds of cognition, direct and reflex. In Direct Cognition we look directly and immediately to the nature of the individual, without comparing it with anything else. We look at it through the idea we form in the intellectual act by which we take cognisance of it, but we do not look at the idea itself. We always begin in all exercise of our minds with a direct cognition of the object which occupies them, and for this reason direct cognition is sometimes called an act of the first intention, because it is what the mind from its very constitution first intends, or turns its attention to, in the act it performs. When for instance I stand before a cage in the Zoological gardens and contemplate one of the animals contained in it, and say, "This is a monkey", the primary object of my thoughts is the individual before me. I consider it through the medium of the idea monkey. My First Intention is to consider this monkey. My idea of monkey is the means I employ to comprehend this particular one of the class. I may[p 166]regard it under all kinds of aspects. I may turn my attention to its thick black hair, or to its grinning teeth, or to its fondness for nuts, or to the fact that it is suckling a little monkey at its breast, or to the malice with which it pinches another monkey which has offended it, but I am in each case considering the various peculiarities of this individual monkey. I am engaged in acts of the First Intention inasmuch as my first intention naturally turns on this particular monkey which has first attracted my notice. But it requires a further and subsequent process to turn my mind from the contemplation of this particular individual to the contemplation of the nature of monkey in general, and the relation to each other of the various ideas that have been passing through my mind respecting it. I must reflect in order to decide whether the term monkey, as I understand it, is applicable to other creatures in the cage before me; whether not only this monkey but all monkeys are mischievous; whether its mischievousness is the same as its malice in pinching its unfortunate neighbour, or whether there is only an accidental connection between the two; whether in virtue of its monkeydom it walks on all fours instead of on two feet; whether there are monkeys who walk upright. In all these considerations I am exercising a Reflex Cognition in that the mind reflects or turns itself back to the consideration of the various ideas that are the result of its direct cognitions. I am performing acts which are Second Intentions of[p 167]the mind, in that the mind by a further and second intellectual act considers, under a new aspect, the various ideas formed in the acts of the first intention. It marshals them in order, that it may take cognisance of them, not as the media through which I apprehend the nature of the poor beast before me, but as separate entities having a certain relation to each other, which I apprehend in themselves as a part of my mental furniture. It contemplates them now as forms of thought which I compare together in order to discover their relations to each other, and to other individual objects to which they are applicable. I now put away the immediate and direct thought of this individual monkey, and I occupy myself immediately and directly with these ideas in themselves[note 1]. I reflect and say to myself: I have been looking at this object before me as a monkey. Why do I call it a monkey? What is the connection between this individual and the idea ot monkey? Why again do I think of it as, and call it, an animal? What is the connection between monkey and animal? What again is the connection between monkey and hirsute? Are all hirsute monkeys?—and so on. [note 1] These Second Intentions of our thoughts, the[p 168]further aspect under which we contemplate the objects and the ideas about which we think, introduce us directly to what are called the five Heads of Predcables. But we may arrive at them by a different road. They are also the various divisions under which all Universal ideas are comprised. We have already spoken of Transcendental and Non-transcendental as one of the divisions of ideas, and we said that Transcendental ideas were certain supreme and exhaustive notions which comprise, under one or another aspect, all existing things. Putting them aside, all other Universal ideas are limited and partial, inasmuch as they comprise only a certain limited number of individuals forming separate and distinct classes. But classes may be large or small, they may exclude or include each other. The class living-things includes under it cauliflowers, sand-eels, porcupines, mosquitoes, apple-trees, negroes, codfish, and members of the House of Legislature; and these various classes mutually exclude one another. One class, on the other hand, may comprise a number of subordinate classes, each of which has other classes subordinate to it, as living things contains under it vegetables and animals, vegetables contains trees, and herbs and shrubs, trees contains cherry-trees, apple-trees, plum-trees, while cherry-trees may be broken up at once into individuals—all the individual cherry-trees real or possible. Corresponding to these classes are Universal ideas or concepts, which express a part or the whole of the essential nature of the various individuals[p 169]in which it is found, and the part contained will be large or small according as the class is a restricted or a wide one. The wider the class, the less of the nature contained in the concept. Living thing tells me very little about the individual monkey I am watching, or the plant I have been studying in the Horticultural Gardens. It is a concept which contains only a small portion of the essence of the individual. The narrower the class, the more I learn about the nature of the individuals, and the greater the amount of the essence of the individual contained in the concept. If any one says to me, "That object is a cherry-tree", I have (accidental differences excluded) all the information possible for man. I know its essential nature; the concept through which I regard it contains the whole of the essence of the individual. Hence, we have one division of Universals according as the concept expresses the whole of the essential nature of the individual or only part of it. But it does not follow that the idea which we form of any individual, expresses any part of its essential nature, although it must be in some way connected with it. It is not from every given class that the individual is necessarily excluded or necessarily included in it. There are many classes to which the individual belongs, many formalities under which he may be regarded, which are not a part of his essence, and do not constitute him what he is and what he always must remain. The Duke of Fitzbattleaxe is necessarily included in the class man, humanity is a part of his essence but he is not[p 170]necessarily as a Duke included in or excluded from the class of good-looking, or rich, or well-mannered. Nor indeed is he of absolute necessity included in the class of members of the Higher Court of Legislature, or of creatures who cook their food, or who wear clothes. There is nothing in the nature of things to prevent him from eating his food raw, or of going about unclad. Universals, therefore, may be, not a part of the essence of the individual, but something joined to it, either being present in some instances, but not in others (as for instance riches or good manners or virtue in the case of individual men): or being always present in point of fact, though the individual might still retain his proper nature, even though this particular quality were absent, as for instance cooking food, or making exchanges, or using spoken language. This gives us five different kinds of Universals, according to the five possible relations of the concept and the individual in whom it exists. 1. The concept may express the whole essence of the individuals, in whom it is found, all else being merely accidental to them; that is to say, any smaller class that we may form than that expressed by the word standing for the concept, contains additional peculiarities which are not essential to the nature of the individuals. Thus man is said to contain the whole essence of the individuals contained under it. It is not an essential characteristic of John Smith that he is an European, or that he is a gambler, or that he is given to too much whisky, or that he is long-limbed, or that he has a white skin, or that he trades with his neighbours, or that he has a[p 171]slight squint, or that he uses very bad language, or that he rarely, if ever, is seen inside a church. When I have said that he is a man, I have set forth all that is essential to his nature, without having to include any of the amiable qualities aforesaid. This furnishes the first of our Heads of Predicables. SPECIES contains the whole essence of the individual, and a concept which thus includes the whole essence is said to be a species in reference to each and all of the individuals contained under the general term. Man in reference to John Smith (or any other member of the human race) is said to be the species to which John Smith belongs. 2. The concept may contain a part of the essence of the individuals. It may not express the whole of that which makes them to be what they are; nor the whole of their essential characteristics, but only some of them. I may break up the concept man into simpler concepts comprised in it. These simpler concepts will not contain the whole of the essence of John Smith, but they will contain a part of his essence. If, for instance, I say that he is an animal (not using the word in any uncomplimentary sense), I express only a part of his essential nature. Or, again, if I say that he is a living being, I express a still smaller part of that which is essential to him. If again I speak of him as rational, or possessed of the power of forming abstract ideas, I am expressing only a portion of his essence, that, namely, which distinguishes him as a man from all[p 172]other animals. I am assigning to him the distinctive or determining part of his essence. Now in this last case the part of his essence which we express is obviously different from that which we express when we say that he is an animal or living being. Animal or living being are the names of wider classes, of more general concepts which have to be restricted by some distinguishing mark. They are called in scholastic language partes determinabiles essentia, parts of the essence representing classes which have to be limited in order that the whole essence may be expressed in the class-name. Rational, on the other hand, is the name of the quality which restricts one of these wider classes: it restricts animal to the species man. It is called the pars determinans essentia, the part of the essence which limits the wider concept in order that in the two combined the whole essence may be contained. The species man is thus composed of the concept rational, added to and determining the concept animal. Thus we obtain two new Heads of Predicables corresponding to these two parts of the essence. Genus expresses the pars determinabilis essentia, or as it is sometimes called, the material part, inasmuch as the matter of which anything is made has to have its shape or essential characteristic given to it by something that forms or informs it. It represents the wider class which has somehow to be limited, in order to reach the species or class which is said to contain his whole essence.[p 173]Differentia expresses the pars determinans essentia, or as it is sometimes called, the formal part, inasmuch as it informs or gives the form to the matter, and gives to what may be regarded as an unformed mass its distinguishing form or shape. It represents the limiting characteristic which has to be added to the wider class in order to limit the wider class as aforesaid. 3. The concept may contain something which is joined to the essence, either flowing from it as effect from cause, and so necessarily joined to it, or not connected with it as effect with cause, but holding such a relation to it that it might be there or not. In the former case the Universal is said to be peculiar to or a property of the individual. It is found in all members of the species. It is invariably and of necessity joined to their inner nature, with which it is connected so intimately that it is present wherever that nature is present and absent where it is absent. Thus able to express his ideas by spoken or written language is a Property of man. It is found in all men; it is invariably united to human nature. Yet it might be absent without encroaching on what is essential to humanity. There is no contradiction in the idea of a man who had a rational nature, yet could not convey his ideas to other men. In the latter case, that is, if the attribute be not connected with the essential nature as effect with cause, it is said to be accidental to the individual. It may or may not be found in all members[p 174]of the class to which the individual belongs, but it is of such a nature that it does not necessarily accompany the inner nature of all the members of a class. It may be present or it may be absent. Thus white, European, teetotaller, Mahometan, learned, virtuous, married, &c, are Accidents of man. They are not in any way connected with humanity as such. Even if they were present in all men, still they would be Accidents. If every living man upon the face of the earth were to take the pledge (and keep it), or were to join the religion of the Prophet, still teetotaller and Mussulman would be Accidents of humanity. Hence an Accident is not merely a quality found in some members of a class, and not in others, but a quality found in some members of a class (and perhaps in all), but unconnected with the essential nature which constitutes the individual members of the class, and which is expressed in the idea or concept under which they are contained. Accordingly we may distinguish Accident into Separable and Inseparable : the former are found in some members of a class, but not in all; the latter are found in all the members of a class, though unconnected with its essence. This gives us two fresh divisions: Property, which is not part of the essence, but is necessarily joined to it by some law of causation, so that it is invariably found in each and all individuals who belong to the species. Accident, which is not part of the essence or necessarily joined to it, but may or may not be[p 175]present in the individuals which belong to the species. Hence we have Five Heads of Predicables; Species, Genus, Differentia, Property, Accident. They are arrived at by the following process of division: Every predicable expresses either
1. Whole essence of individuals . Species . ([greek]).
(Material part . Genus . ([greek]).
2 Part of essence,
(Formal part . Differentia . (greek]).
(Necessarily . Property . ([greek]).
3. Something joined to essence
(Contingently . Accident . ([greek]).
But why are they called Heads of Predicables? Because they are predicated of, or proclaimed as belonging to, a number of different individuals. We can assert each of them as true, not of one object alone, but of many. Moreover, they are the various divisions or heads of all possible concepts in their relation to each other and to the individuals of which we think; or, to put it another way, they are the among the results of our acts of reflex or indirect cognition. There still remain several important considerations respecting some of them. 1. For each individual there may be many classes under which it falls from the highest of all (which is the first breaking up of the Universal, or rather the Transcendental concept of Being) down to the lowest before we come to individuals, the concept which expresses the whole of the essential nature of all the objects contained[p 176]under it. Between these there are a number of classes greater or smaller according as they approach more nearly to the concept of Being, or to the concept which is broken up directly into individuals and contains their whole essence. This gives us a new division of Genus and Species respectively. We have first of all a Genus which can never be a Species; last of all a Species which can never be a Genus, and between the two a number of classes accommodating enough to be one or the other, as need shall require. (a) The Summum Genus is the highest and largest class of all, the first breaking up of the Transcendental and all-embracing concept of Being. (b) The Infima Species is the lowest and smallest class, the last Universal, the smallest collection of individual objects. (c) Subordinate, or Subaltern, or Intermediate classes are respectively genera or species, according as we consider them in relation to the smaller classes below them, or the larger classes above them. In relation to the former they are genera; in relation to the latter they are species. Genera with regard to those below them; species with regard to those above them. Thus animal is a genus as compared with man, a species as compared with beings that live. Mammals is a genus in regard to seals, a species as compared with animals. Jewels is a genus with regard to diamonds, a species with regard to stones, or to things without life. 2. We have said that these universal concepts may be looked at in a double aspect. They are at[p 177]the same time something contained in the individual, and something under which the individual is contained. They are both ideas comprising attributes, and classes comprising individuals. Man as such is either an idea which, expressed in the abstract, is humanity, or a class belonging to the concrete order, and which may be termed mankind. In the scholastic language every Universal may be regarded as a metaphysical or a logical whole[note 1]; as a metaphysical whole it is a sort of bundle of attributes, as a logical whole it is a sort of bundle of individuals, actual and possible. Man as a metaphysical whole, as an abstract idea, comprises the attributes rational, sensitive, living, &c. Man, as a logical whole, as a class, comprises all the individual men who have existed, are in existence now, or who shall hereafter exist. As a metaphysical whole it contains metaphysical parts, the narrower concepts or attributes: as a logical whole it contains logical parts, the smaller classes or individual objects. Now the contents of the concept under these two aspects are in an inverse ratio to each other; the greater the extension the fewer the attributes. This is the case throughout the series of classes[p 178]which proceed from the highest to the lowest, from the Summum Genus to the Infima Species. 1. There are other wholes which do not concern us as logicians, except in so far as we must be on our guard against confusing them with the logical and metaphysical whole. Thus there is the Physical whole, containing physical parts, viz., matter and form, or substance and accident; the Collective whole, where the parts are simply a number of separate things accidentally united, as a regiment of soldiers or a heap of stones; the mathematical whole, composed of mathematical and integrating parts, as a tree, root, stem, branches, leaves, &c. 3. The Summum Genus as being the largest class next to the Transcendental concept of Being under which all existing objects can be ranged, cannot be subordinated to any higher Genus, therefore never can be a Species. It is the colonel of the regiment who can never be a subordinate officer, and is subject only to the Transcendental concept, which is the general in command of the whole army of existing things. It is called by the Greek logicians [greek ...] (the most generic of all genera). It has the maximum of extension inasmuch as it is the most extensive class under which the individual can be ranged, and it contains a maximum of members composing the class. It is, moreover, the minimum of comprehension, inasmuch as it is the simplest of all concepts, and so has a minimum of attributes contained in it. It is of all logical wholes the greatest; of all metaphysical wholes the smallest. 4. The Infima Species as being the last class we come to previous to the individuals, is subordinate to all the classes above it, and therefore never can be a genus. It is the lance-corporal, the lowest of non-commissioned officers, who never can have any command, except over private soldiers. It is called by the Greek logicians " [greek ...], the most specific of all species. It is the minimum of extension, inasmuch as it is the least extensive of all classes under which the individual can be ranged. It is, moreover, the maximum of comprehension, inasmuch as it is the most comprehensive[p 179]of all ideas, and so has a maximum of qualities or attributes contained in it. It is of all logical wholes the smallest, of all metaphysical wholes the greatest. 5. Between the Summum Genus and the Infima Species there are a number of classes which are called Subalterns, and which are subordinate to all the classes above them, while the classes below them are subordinate to them. They take the character of genus or species, according as we compare them with a class below, or with a class above them. They are the various officers of the regiment, commissioned and non-commissioned, who are between the colonel in command of the whole regiment and the corporal, who commands nothing but private soldiers. They are called by Greek logicians subaltern genera [greek ...]. They contain under them more individuals in proportion as they approach to the Summum Genus, but fewer qualities. They contain in them more qualities in proportion as they approach the Infima Species, but fewer individuals. They are both logical and metaphysical wholes: logical wholes in respect of the smaller classes and individuals contained under them, Metaphysical wholes in respect of the narrower concepts or qualities contained in them. We observe, therefore, that Species is used in two rather different senses. 1. Sometimes it means that class which contains the whole essence of the individuals contained under it, and which, therefore, has no species beneath it. This is the Infima Species, and none other. 2. Sometimes it means that class[p 180]which contains the whole essence common to the concepts contained in it, and also the smaller classes into which it is immediately broken up. Thus animal is the species of men and brutes taken together, as containing the nature common to both of them. This is the Subaltern Species, which holds the same relation to the species which immediately come under it, when they are regarded in respect of what is common to all of them, that the Infima Species holds in relation to the individuals. It is, therefore, called Species in relation to those immediately subordinate species, in contrast to the classes above it, which are called genera in relation to them. Just as man contains the whole of the nature common to John, Peter, Susan, Jane, &c, so does animal the whole nature common to men, birds, beasts, fishes, insects, &c. We may now illustrate what we have been saying by the familiar Porphyrian tree. At the root lies the Summum Genus, Substance, while the leaves represent individual objects. We shall pursue only one branch, that which is to lead to individual men. We begin by breaking up the Summum Genus of substance into material and immaterial, and as men are material beings, we fix our attention on material substances, or Bodies. We then break up Bodies into Organic[note 1] and Inorganic, and as men have organized bodies, we add Organic to body and thus obtain the further class of Living things. But still[p 181]we are far from man. Some living things are sensitive to pleasure, pain, etc., others are not. An apple-tree does not, as far as we know, suffer from dyspepsia, or a cabbage from headaches; and we select in our progress An image goes here towards the human kind those bodies which can feel pain. We thus obtain animals, and man begins to dawn upon our view. But we have not reached[p 182]him yet, and we must therefore break up animals. We must narrow the class by the addition of rational, and thus we reach at last the Infima species of rational animal or man. Man we cannot break up, except into individuals, Socrates, Cassar, St. Paul, Shakespeare, etc. [note 1] But here a difficulty meets us. Why is man an Infima Species? Why should we not break him up into white and coloured, virtuous and vicious, heathen and Christian, European, Asiatic, American, African, and Australasian? If we give as the reason that man contains all the essence of individual men we seem to be answering beside the point. For what do we mean by essence? That which makes them to be what they are. But does not their education, parentage, place of birth, etc., make them to be what they are and contribute to their formation? Why then should we not make lower classes based on these considerations? Now, if we examine these various differentiating qualities by which it is proposed to form classes narrower than that of man, we shall find that many of them are eliminated by the fact that they can be separated even from the individual. A man who is vicious one day may be virtuous the next: a heathen may become christian. These therefore are separable accidents of the individual and cannot belong to his inner nature. But there are others which are not separable from the individual. A blackamoor can never become white, an Asiatic remains an Asiatic (in the proper sense of being born in Asia of Asiatic parents) even though he may have passed seventy years in Europe[p 183]or America. These then we may call inseparable accidents of the individual, and the united sum of them may be called his Differentia (in a wide sense of the term) inasmuch as he is marked off from other men by his height, colour, speech, intelligence, and strength, together with all those other qualities which, taken collectively, characterize him as an individual. But it is not enough that a quality should be inseparable either from an individual or from a class, in order to constitute it part of its essence or inner nature. It must be not only inseparable in fact but also inseparable in thought. It must be in such a relation to the rest of his nature that it could not be changed without introducing a contradiction into his nature. Essences are indivisible, say scholastic logicians, as well as immutable. They cannot be changed, and we cannot think of them as changed, without an anomaly presenting itself in the nature, an element of which has been thus reversed. This then is the test in the case of individuals and of classes alike. In order to discover what is a part of their essence we must ask: If I took away this or that quality, if I reversed it, would their nature simply remain the same as before, save only that this one attribute has disappeared? If it would, then the attribute in question is no part of the essence. But if there would be a general disturbance, if there would be a general change in the whole nature, then such a quality belongs to the essence and is part of the inner nature. [p 184]Now, if we apply this test to all the various qualities by which we proposed above to break up man into lower classes, we shall find that every one of them might be conceived as reversed without the man, so to speak, losing his identity. If he is an European, he will not have his nature changed if we suppose him born in Asia ; if he is a man of talent, he will still remain the same individual man if by some strange transformation he becomes a dullard. If he is a negro, we can think of him as remaining in all respects the same, though his skin should become white. If he is cross-grained, his identity will be the same, even though he overcomes himself and becomes the sweetest-tempered man on the face of the earth. But if we take any of the attributes which belong to man as such, it is quite different. Take away from man the faculty of sensation and he is a different being at once. He can perceive none of the things around him, cannot sustain his life, cannot avoid dangers, cannot gather the materials for general concepts, cannot exercise his reason. This faculty is so interlaced with the other faculties of man, that it cannot be separated even in thought without destroying his nature. So it is with all the other qualities which make up the concept man, and we are therefore justified in saying that each and all of these belong to the essence of the individual and are not separable from him either in fact or thought. We may express this in other words by saying that we have the power of discerning the essences of[p 185]things, of piercing through the characteristics of the individual to the essential nature underlying it. When we have any object presented to us we are enabled by the reason that God has given us to see what qualities belong to the individual (and this whether they are in practice separable or inseparable from him) and what belong to the species to which he appertains. This is what is meant by the faculty of abstraction, by means of which we neglect the individuating qualities, and fix our minds only on those which constitute the specific concept under which the individual is ranged by virtue of his inner and essential nature. The existence of an absolute Infima Species, which is broken up at once into individuals and below which no lower species can be framed, is of course denied by modern logicians, who depart from the doctrine of Aristotle and the Scholastics. "In point of fact," says Sir. W. Hamilton, "it is impossible in theory to reach any lowest species; for we can always conceive some difference by which any concept may be divided ad infinitum. This, however, as it is only a speculative curiosity, like the infinitesimal divisibility of matter, may be thrown out of view in practice." This "speculative curiosity", which our modern conceptualist puts aside with such jaunty ease, really involves the whole question of the formation of Universals, and on our decision respecting it depends the absolute character of Truth. If essences are realities, not figments of the human mind; if man possesses an intellect capable of discerning the invisible under the visible,[p 186]the inner nature under the external manifestation of it; if we have faculties which are different in kind from those of the brutes, and which enable us to take cognisance not only of phenomena but of noumena, not only of things transitory and perishable but of things immutable and eternal—this doctrine of an absolute Infima Species, is a necessary element in our philosophical convictions, the absence of which would involve us in a number of serious contradictions and would render the attainment of Truth a thing impossible to the whole human race. On the other hand, Mill and Bain[note 1], and those to whom we have given the name of the Modern Nominalists, concede with a greater appreciation of truth, but with very considerable inconsistency, the existence of what they call real or natural kinds, which are distinguished from those artificial kinds which the mind fashions for itself. "A real kind", says Mill is one which is distinguished from all other classes by an indefinite multitude of properties not derivable from each other." This is one of several cases in which the school of Mill approximates to the Aristotelian philosophy, but in so doing he does but thereby the more completely condemn his own system. If kinds are real, if we do but recognize the distinctions which already exist in nature, the whole system of scholastic realism is by such an acknowledgment virtually recognized to be true. What constitutes the reality of those kinds save that the same generic or specific nature is found in all the individuals belonging to any one[p 187]of them? The identity of what are called common attributes is no longer a convenient fiction of our intelligence, but is based on an objective fact, which is true independently of the intelligence which takes cognisance of it. [note 1] At the other end of the series to the Infima Species which breaks up into individuals, is the Summum Genus, which cannot be broken up into any classes beyond it. In our tree given above we have substance as the Summum Genus. If we had started from something which does not exist in itself, but in something else, we should have had accident as our Summum Genus. Everything must either exist in itself or it must inhere in something else. If the former, it falls under the class of Substances, complete or incomplete; if the latter, under the class of Accidents : and therefore Substance and Accidents are the two Summa Genera, the two all-embracing classes, to one or other of which all terrestrial things capable of being conceived in thought belong, since everything has an existence either in itself, and that may be called its own, or else in something else, on which it depends and in which it inheres. If the latter, i.e., if it inheres in some other object it is an Accident, or mode of being of that object. The Accidents are nine in number, and are arrived at as follows: Every mode of being which can be ascribed to an object either expresses something inherent in it, or something outside of it, which, however, in some way affects and characterizes it. In the former case the[p 188 ON THE HEADS OF PREDICABLES]inherent mode of being either proceeds from the material element in the object (quantity), or from its formal or distinguishing element (quality), or from the bearing of something within it to something without (relation). For instance, the fact that a man weighs fifteen stone proceeds from his material element and belongs to the category of quantity; his wisdom or goodness from the characteristics determining his nature, and therefore falls under the category of quality; his being older or younger than his brother is clearly an instance of his relation to something outside. If, however, the manner of being ascribed to it is derived from something external to it, it is derived from something which it works outside of itself (action), or from something which is worked in it (passion), or from something which is regarded as its measure, viz., the time when it exists, or the place where it exists, or its attitude, that is, the position in space which its several parts occupy. Or last of all that which is externally related to it may be something which is not its measure, but is attached to it, and so in some way characterizes it as one of its surroundings or belongings. For instance, the so-called Accidents of man derived from things external to himself are that he is killing, or comforting, or helping; in which case we have various forms of action or else he is being killed, or comforted, or helped, and then he is passive; or if his position in space is described, he is characterized as here or there, near or far. If in time, he is one who belongs to the fourteenth century, or to the present time, whereas his attitude is that he is[p 189]sitting down or standing up, cross-legged, or sprawling, etc. Finally his surroundings or belongings(habitus) adjacent to him in space constitute his dress or equipments. He is armed with a rifle or has on a tall hat, or Wellington boots. We may put this in tabular form. An image goes here To recapitulate: If we say anything about some object which has an existence of its own, we must speak either of its quantity quantitas or its qualities (qualitas) or its relation (relatio) the things around it; what it is doing (actio or what is being done to it (passio); of the place ubi) or time (quando of its existence, or of its position (situs or external belongings (habitus). These form the nine different classes under one or other of which every Accident must fall, and these added to Substance form the ten Categories, as they are called by Aristotle, under which all ideas or concepts ultimately fall. In scholastic logic they are called pr[ae]dicamenta or predicaments; and as when any idea gets into[p 190]one of them it can get no further, hence has arisen, by a strange freak of language, the familiar expression of "getting into a predicament", to express the unpleasant situation of one who has involved himself in circumstances from which he would fain escape but cannot[note1]. [note 1]
Summa decem: Quantum, Substantia, Quale, Relatio,
Actio, Passio, ubi, Quando, situs, habitus.
The Greek equivalent, no less than the Latin, requires an apology for the false quantity and other defects of versification.
[greek ...]
But what is the difference between the Predicaments or Categories and the Heads of Predicables? The Categories are a classification of all existing things as they are in themselves, regarded in their own proper being, as the object of our mental concepts or ideas, as capable of being introduced into our minds and forming part of our mental furniture. Thus, if we are asked under what category tree falls, we answer at once: "Tree is a substance, i.e., has an independent existence of its own." Under what category does goodness fall? "Under the category of quality." In the same way son or master falls under relation, to-morrow falls under the category of time, ill-treated under the category of passio, etc. The Heads of Predicables are, on the other hand, a classification of the forms of thought, that is to say, of the various relations our ideas or concepts bear to each other. They put our mental furniture[p 191]in order and express the connection between the ideas which constitute it. They express the kinship of our mental conceptions—the connection between the concepts or ideas present to our intellect under their aspect of entia rationis (to use the scholastic expression), that is, as things which derive their being from human thought, which are manufactured by the mind, though the material comes from outside. They are not the classes into which external objects can be divided, but the classes under which our ideas or concepts of external objects fall in respect of each other. If I am asked under what predicable does tree fall? I have to compare the concept of tree with other concepts before I can answer the question. Tree, I answer, is a genus in respect of oak, a species in respect of living thing. Under what predicable must good be classed? I cannot answer the question until you tell me with what other concept it is to be compared. Goodness, if you mean moral goodness, is an accident of man, but is a property of the inhabitants of Heaven, inasmuch as it flows from that confirmed sanctity, which is the essential mark of the saints who have attained their reward. There are, however, two classes of concepts which can be classified at once without reference to any other concept, if only a sufficient study of the matter has made us acquainted with their essential nature. Infima Species and Summum Genus are fixed and absolute, as we have already seen. Under what category does man fall? I can answer at once: it is the species which expresses the whole[p 192]essential nature of the individuals contained in it. So again, tiger, oak, eagle. Under what category does Substance fall? Here too the reply is ready. "Substance is a Summum Genus and can be nothing else." Hence the Categories are sometimes said to be an enumeration of things as they come under the first intentions of the mind, that is, under our direct acts of cognition. As we explained above[note 1] the Predicables are an enumeration of the second intentions of the mind, of our indirect or reflex cognitions, inasmuch as they are a relative classification of the concepts we form of things, viewed in their mutual connection with each other. [note 1] |